China Accuses Foreigners of Military Use of Rare Earths
17 hours ago7 min read1 comments

In a strategic maneuver that sent immediate shockwaves through global defense and technology sectors, China has formally accused unspecified foreign entities of diverting its rare earth exports for military applications, a charge delivered concurrently with the Ministry of Commerce's announcement of stringent new export controls effective Thursday. These freshly minted regulations erect a formidable barrier, explicitly prohibiting the transfer of Chinese technology and expertise related to the mining and processing of these critical minerals without explicit state sanction, a move that effectively grants Beijing a veto over the entire downstream supply chain for materials it overwhelmingly dominates.This is not merely a trade policy adjustment; it is a calculated escalation in the simmering techno-economic cold war, leveraging China's near-monopolistic position—controlling over 60% of global rare earth mining and a staggering 90% of refining capacity—as a geopolitical cudgel. The seventeen elements classified as rare earths, with deceptively mundane names like neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, are the unsung heroes of modern civilization, the absolute linchpins without which everything from the guidance systems of F-35 fighter jets and the permanent magnets in Virginia-class submarines to the motors powering the global electric vehicle revolution and the satellites comprising mega-constellations like Starlink simply cannot be built.Historical precedent looms large here; the world vividly recalls the 2010 crisis when China slashed exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing prices to skyrocket by over 600% and triggering a frantic, albeit only partially successful, global scramble for alternative sources. The current announcement, therefore, must be analyzed not in isolation but as part of a deliberate, multi-year strategy of weaponizing economic interdependence, a tactic Beijing has previously deployed with quotas and tariffs but now elevates to a more sophisticated level by controlling the intellectual property required to transform raw ore into usable material.The vagueness of the accusation—'unnamed foreign organisations and individuals'—is itself a masterstroke of geopolitical risk, creating a blanket of uncertainty that forces every Western defense contractor and tech giant to scrutinize their supply chains while allowing Beijing plausible deniability, a fog of war in the economic domain. Scenario planning immediately points to several high-probability consequences: a renewed and urgent push in the United States and European Union to onshore or friend-shore rare earth processing, with projects like the Mountain Pass mine in California gaining renewed political and financial momentum; a surge in speculative investing in junior mining companies from Australia to Greenland; and intensified diplomatic efforts to forge a multinational rare earths buyers' cartel to counterbalance China's seller dominance.However, the immense technical and environmental hurdles cannot be overstated—establishing a separate, non-Chinese supply chain is a decadal, capital-intensive project fraught with challenges, from the toxic, radioactive waste produced by processing to the scarcity of the specialized engineering talent required, much of which currently resides in China. Expert commentary from geopolitical risk firms suggests this move is a direct response to escalating Western technology containment efforts, such as the CHIPS Act and ever-tightening controls on advanced semiconductor exports to China, representing a symmetrical counter-punch aimed at a critical Western vulnerability.The long-term strategic calculus for Beijing is clear: in a world fracturing into competing technological spheres, control over the foundational elements of advanced hardware grants not just economic advantage but formidable diplomatic and military leverage, turning a suite of obscure metals into the high-stakes chess pieces of 21st-century power politics. The immediate market reaction—a sharp uptick in share prices for the few non-Chinese rare earth firms—is just the initial, superficial tremor of a decision that fundamentally recalibrates the global balance of technological power, signaling that the era of reliable access to these critical materials is over, replaced by an era of strategic competition where resource security is inextricably linked to national security.